Capital Inflows, Exchange Rate Flexibility, and Credit Booms by Nicolas E. Magud et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We thank seminar participants at the IMF, the Central Bank of Chile, and the Central Bank of Paraguay.
We also thank Marco Arena, Martin Evans, Anton Korinek, Marcelo Olaverria, Sergio Schmukler,
and Rodrigo Valdes for useful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are ours. This paper
represents only the authors' views and not those of the International Monetary Fund, its Executive
Board, its Management, the Peterson Institute for International Economics, or the National Bureau
of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Nicolas E. Magud, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Esteban R. Vesperoni. All rights reserved.
Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided
that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Capital Inflows, Exchange Rate Flexibility, and Credit Booms
Nicolas E. Magud, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Esteban R. Vesperoni




The prospects of expansionary monetary policies in the advanced countries for the foreseeable future
have renewed the debate over policy options to cope with large capital inflows that are, at least partly,
driven by low interest rates in the financial centers. Historically, capital flow bonanzas have often
fueled sharp credit expansions in advanced and emerging market economies alike. Focusing primarily
on emerging markets, we analyze the impact of exchange rate flexibility on credit markets during periods
of large capital inflows. We show that credit grows more rapidly and its composition tilts to foreign
currency in economies with less flexible exchange rate regimes, and that these results are not explained
entirely by the fact that the latter attract more capital inflows than economies with more flexible regimes.
Our findings thus suggest countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes may stand to benefit the
most from regulatory policies that reduce banks’ incentives to tap external markets and to lend/borrow
in foreign currency; these policies include marginal reserve requirements on foreign lending, currency-dependent
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Capital inflows bonanzas have become more frequent after restrictions to 
international movements were relaxed worldwide over the last decades.
2 Capital flows to 
emerging economies can finance investment and foster economic growth, as well as increase 
welfare by facilitating consumption smoothing. However, inflows may also induce excessive 
monetary and credit expansions, build vulnerabilities associated with currency mismatches, 
and distort asset prices.
3 Large inflows tend to be associated with expansionary economic 
policies and behave procyclically.
4  These linkages between surges in capital inflows and 
financial excess are not limited to emerging markets, as the recent wave of crises in advanced 
economies attest.
5 
The prospects of expansionary monetary policies in advanced countries have renewed 
the debate over policy options to cope with large capital inflows in emerging economies. As 
in the past, spillovers from low international interest rates will likely have a significant 
impact in emerging economies. These spillovers may be stronger this time around, for two 
reasons. First, as advanced economies struggle with a massive public and private debt 
overhang, expansionary monetary policies may be in place for a longer period of time than in 
past “normal” business cycles (a ‘push factor’).
6 Second, emerging markets have been 
conspicuously resilient during the financial crisis, increasing investors’ appetite for the asset 
class (possibly a ‘pull factor’—although the relative attractiveness of emerging markets may 
also stem from another push factor owing to the higher perceived risk of advanced 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), and references therein. 
3 See Magud et al (2011) describing the four fears to capital inflows. 
4 Kaminsky et al (2004). 
5 See Reinhart and  Rogoff (2009). 
6 For the importance of ‘push factors’ during capital inflows booms, see Calvo et al (1995). 2 
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economies, unprecedented since World War II).
7 The debate over the right policy mix to cope 
with capital flows has been and continues to be extensive. However, it has overlooked some 
dimensions of the role played by the exchange rate regime, an issue we take up in this paper.  
We show that during capital inflow bonanzas, credit grows more rapidly and its 
composition tilts to foreign currency in economies with relatively inflexible exchange rate 
regimes.  Studies on economic performance under different exchange regimes have tended to 
focus on growth, inflation, fiscal policies, and current account adjustments, but have been 
relatively silent on the evolution of domestic credit. In a recent paper, Mendoza and Terrones 
(2008) show that capital inflows increase before the peak in credit booms, and that these 
latter have a higher frequency under less flexible exchange rate regimes. We discuss and 
document why and how this relationship between capital inflows, domestic credit, and 
exchange rate regimes works through banking intermediation. The main analysis is based on 
a panel of 25 emerging markets in Asia, Europe, and Latin America.  We identify periods of 
capital inflows booms and document that episodes of relatively inflexible exchange rate 
regimes are positively associated with the ratio of private credit to GDP. We also show that 
the share of foreign currency credit is positively associated with less flexible exchange 
regimes. The share of foreign currency credit also increases with larger capital inflows and 
interest rate differentials.   
These developments in credit could potentially be exclusively explained if countries 
with more rigid exchange rate arrangements tend to record larger capital inflows. However, 
                                                 
7 Capital flow reversals were mild compared to previous inflows, and relatively short-lived. 3 
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by analyzing the relationship of the ratio of capital flows to GDP and the exchange rate 
regime, we do not find compelling evidence that this is the case.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
conceptual links between exchange rate regimes and credit growth patterns while revisiting 
the existing literature. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the methodology for 
defining capital inflows booms and for panel estimations. Section V shows the basic results, 
as well as robustness checks encompassed in alternative estimations. Section VI gives a 
snapshot of credit and exchange rate flexibility in advanced economies Section VII discusses 
results, policy implications and directions for future research. 
 
II. Exchange Rate Arrangements and Credit: Basic Concepts 
   The collapse of several pegged exchange rate regimes during the 1990s led to the 
perception that these arrangements were more prone to currency and financial crises after 
sharp credit expansions.
8 In this context, in a study of the occurrence of twin crises, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show banking crises and currency crises in close succession. 
Overall, evidence on the link between crises and alternative exchange rate regimes is not 
clear-cut, but the literature suggests that the exchange regime may have an impact on 
developments in financial markets and asset prices, through several channels.
9 
The basic textbook prediction tells us that in an economy with a pure floating 
exchange rate regime capital inflows would appreciate the domestic currency with no further 
effect on monetary aggregates. With a fixed exchange rate, however, the central bank would 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Ghosh et al (2003) and Ghosh et al (2010). 
9 For a discussion on the probability of crises and the severity of their macroeconomic impact under alternative 
exchange regimes, see Ghosh et al (2003), Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003), and references therein. 4 
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be forced to intervene, accumulating international reserves so as to maintain the peg. Part or 
all of this reserve accumulation can be (in principle) offset through sterilization, a contraction 
in domestic credit effected through open market sales of domestic bonds.  In practice, 
sterilization is usually partial, as it is costly (risk premiums on domestic bonds may be large 
in emerging economies) and foreign exchange intervention is associated with expanding the 
monetary base. Consequently, economies with less flexible exchange rate regimes are more 
likely to experience credit expansions in the presence of large capital inflows, the main 
channel being bank intermediation of these flows. 
Montiel and Reinhart (2001) describe another channel through which exchange 
regimes may affect financial markets. They argue that by extending implicit improperly 
priced guarantees, fixed exchange regimes may contribute to stronger credit growth than 
flexible ones, especially in the context of large capital inflows. Hence, deposit guarantees and 
a peg are perceived as a guarantee to foreign currency claims, increasing the scope for banks’ 
expansion through external funds, which can potentially feed into domestic credit (i.e., an 
increase in the banking system’s leverage ratio). In a different context, Backé and Wójcik 
(2007) develop a simple framework with an increasing trend in productivity growth in an 
emerging economy that pegs its domestic currency to a developed economy with constant 
productivity growth.
10 The peg gives place to lower interest rates and higher domestic credit 
compared to the equilibrium with a flexible regime. 
A credible fixed exchange rate regime may also place incentives for taking on debt in 
foreign currency. To begin with, the increase in banks’ leverage—loan to deposit ratios—that 
                                                 
10 This is particularly relevant in Emerging Europe. 5 
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large capital inflows usually bring about can place incentives to lend directly in foreign 
currency, as this would allow banks to avoid currency mismatches in their balance sheets. As 
for debtors, in credible pegs, a small differential between interest rates in domestic and 
foreign currency may create incentives to borrow in the latter, as they would deflate a lower 
interest rate by expected domestic inflation or wage growth.
11 These incentives have typically 
played a critical role during inflation stabilization programs, especially when they were 
coupled with policies allowing liability dollarization. Cavallo and Cottani (1997), for 
example, analyze the Argentinean experience with the currency board where the peg, as a 
nominal anchor, played a fundamental role in the dollarization of the financial system.
12 
Our preceding discussion highlights that the flexibility of the exchange rate regime 
should be an important element in conceiving the policy mix to cope with large capital 
inflows and domestic credit expansions.
13 The potential impact of the exchange regime on 
both the amount and composition of private credit highlights the importance of macro-
prudential regulations like marginal reserve requirements on foreign lending, currency-
dependent liquidity requirements, debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios, and higher capital 
requirement and/or dynamic provisioning on foreign exchange (FX) loans.  
 
 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008), and the underlying theoretical model on the determinants of 
credit dollarization developed by Jeanne (2003). 
12 While policies allowing liability dollarization created challenges, the authors highlight that they were critical 
to extending the maturity of financial assets, thus reducing the risks associated with short-term debt overhangs. 
13 See, for example, Ostry et al (2010) for a recent debate on these issues. For a discussion on the effects 
exchange rate flexibility on domestic demand see International Monetary Fund (2010). 6 
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III. Data and Coverage 
We use annual data for five Asian economies (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand), 13 emerging European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, 
Serbia, and Turkey), and seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay). The series span different periods, chosen using the 
criterion defined below for identifying capital inflows booms. For Latin America we use data 
for the period 1993-2002; for Asia, 1990-1997; and for Emerging Europe, 1999-2008. 
As for macroeconomic variables, time series were obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook databases, 
numerous IMF’s Staff Reports for the countries in our sample, national central banks, Saint 
Louise Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED database, Haver Analytics databases, and Eurostat. 
These series are real GDP, external debt, exports and imports of goods and services, the 
external capital and financial account balance, interest rates, domestic credit to the private 
sector, consumer price indices, broad money, the real effective exchange rate, and domestic 
credit in foreign currency. For the international interest rate, we used the U.S. 2-year 
Treasury bonds, as well as Fed funds rate and the European Central Bank policy rate, with 
similar results in all specifications. 
For the exchange rate regime, we used the Reinhart and Rogoff de-facto exchange 
rate regime (COARSE) classification.
14 In the latter, regimes are classified as described in 
                                                 
14 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and the subsequent update from Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). 
Updates for Emerging Europe in 2008 were based on changes in exchange rate regimes as described in the 
Fund’s AREAER. 7 
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Figure 1 below, with an increase in the index pointing to more flexible exchange rate 
regimes. We have also considered Reinhart and Rogoff’s fine classification, and the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), which for 
the more recent period yield similar results. Given the time-varying nature of exchange rate 
regimes, using de-facto arrangements have the advantage of drawing a distinction between 
what countries declare as their official de jure regime and their actual practices, which may 
even capture to a certain degree the endogeneity of policies, shocks, and markets reactions.
15  
             
 
The variable labeled financial deepness is based on measures of financial 
development pioneered by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000), which was updated 
since this work began in the early 2000s.
16 The index reflects the sum of stock market 
                                                 
15 Notice that our empirical methodology is based on ex-post information, i.e., is backward-looking. An 
alternative approach could be to conduct event studies to capture market reactions on an ex-ante basis. Event 
studies could focus on authorities’ announcements (signals), and analyze how forward-looking agents react to 
these announcements. 
16 We are grateful to Sergio Schmukler for kindly sharing with us the updated Beck et al (2009) database. 
1N o  separate legal tender
1P r e  announced peg or currency board arrangement
1P r e  announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/‐2%
1D e  facto peg
2P r e  announced crawling peg
2P r e  announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/‐2%
2D e  factor crawling peg
2D e  facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/‐2%
3P r e  announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/‐2%
3D e  facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/‐5%









capitalization, deposits, and private and public bond market capitalization, all in terms of 
GDP.   Financial integration is the index for financial openness developed by Chinn and  
Ito.
17 This index measures the scope of capital controls based on the information from the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
IV. Methodology 
We pursue three different tasks in this section. First, we identify capital inflows 
booms in the countries included in the dataset. Second, we define the three dependent 
variables in the exercise and explore the relationship between the exchange rate regimes, 
capital flows, and the amount and composition of domestic credit to the private sector 
through cross-plot analysis. Finally, we describe the econometric methodology used in the 
paper to test the impact of the exchange regimes on credit and capital flows. 
1. Identifying Capital Inflows Booms 
The countries in the sample have not necessarily experienced capital inflows booms 
simultaneously. Asian and Latin American countries received large capital inflows during the 
1990s and the early 2000s, while Emerging Europe recorded large capital inflows in the 
2000s. Furthermore, although Latin America and Asia received large inflows during the same 
decade, the specific years differ. Therefore, our first task is to identify periods of large capital 
inflows systematically before pooling the data. 
Definition 1. We define a capital flow boom as: 
                                                 
17 See Chinn and Ito (2008). 9 
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(i)  a period in which trend capital inflows monotonically increase with a structural 
trend change; or 
(ii)  a period  :      |     ,   ,…,   in which inflows exceeds their long-term 
trend, i.e.    ,        , , where    , .refers to capital inflows in region   during 
period  . A bar over a variable represents its long-term value. 
 
First, we compute regional cyclical components of capital flows.
18 For each region—
 :     |    1,2,3 —we compute the total volume of capital inflows by adding the dollar-
value of capital inflows of each country   
 :    
              
 ,   
 ,…,    
    for the   
1,2,...,   countries, as    
    ∑    ,  
 
     
 
  
     , obtaining total regional capital flows in each 
year t. These series are then de-trended using the standard Hodrick-Prescott filter. As we are 
using annual data, we set     100. The cyclical components are computed by subtracting the 
HP-trended value from total capital inflows in each period t. 
Figure 2 below depicts trend and observed total component in their left panels and the 
cyclical component in the right panels. In the early 1990s, Latin America and Asia received 
large capital inflows, which reversed during the early 2000s for Latin America, and during 
the late 1990s for Asia. Capital inflows in Emerging Europe were virtually zero before the 
late 1990s, and picked up with prospects for European Union access in the early 2000s. 
  
                                                 
18 We conduct this exercise regionally due to heterogeneity among regions. 10 
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Following Definition 1, we identify capital inflows booms as follows: 
  For Emerging Europe, we define a capital inflows boom between 1999 and 2008. 
Trend capital inflows were virtually zero before the late 1990s, and switched to an 
increasing positive value in 1999. While the trend remains positive in 2009, we 
exclude this year from the sample as the region as a whole experienced a sharp 
reversal in capital flows. 
  For Latin America and Asia, the periods are defined as 1993-2002 and 1990-1997 
respectively. For these two regions—and especially in Asia—observations over the 
entire sample period seem to be mean-reverting—with capital inflows during the 
1990s and outflows thereafter. As such, periods of large capital inflows are better 
defined by identifying periods in which inflows are above their long-term trend.  
After identifying regional capital inflows bonanzas, we build a panel of 25 cross-
sections, with 10 observations per cross-section in Latin American and Europe, and 8 
observations in Asia. Note that this method for identifying regional bonanza episodes accords 
well with the country-by-country approach developed in Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), as, 
for example, Asian capital flow bonanzas in that study are bunched in the 1990-1996 period. 
The maximum sample size is 240 annual observations. 
2. The indicators 
The three variables we study are defined as follows. The domestic credit variable is 
the ratio of banking system credit to the private sector to gross domestic product at current 
prices. The second variable—foreign currency credit—is defined as the ratio of credit to the 
private sector in foreign currency to total credit to the private sector. The capital flows 12 
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variable is defined as the ratio of capital flows to the gross domestic product at current prices, 
both in US dollars. The association between domestic credit, capital inflows and the 
exchange rate regime can be promptly illustrated through cross-plot charts: 
  Figure 3, panel (a) suggests that credit to the private sector is higher in economies 
with less flexible exchange regimes. 
  Figure 3, panel (b) shows that there seems to be a significant relationship between the 
share of credit in foreign currency and exchange rate regimes, with a higher share in 
economies with less flexible regimes. 
  Figure 3, panel (c) shows that capital flows are higher in economies with less flexible 
exchange rate regimes. The scatter, though, suggests that this relationship may be 







































































































































3. Econometric Methodology 
There are a number of empirical studies analyzing macroeconomic performance 
under alternative exchange rate regimes. This literature concentrates on the study of the 
behavior of growth, interest rates, fiscal policy, inflation, and the external accounts. Using 
panel regressions, they analyze the role played by the exchange rate regime by using 
variables classifying exchange rate regimes on either ‘de jure’ or ‘de facto’ basis.  
To study the impact of alternative exchange regimes on capital inflows and domestic 
credit, we use the same broad approach as in the recent literature.
19  We extend the analysis 
by controlling for the degree of domestic financial development and the financial integration 
with international capital markets. We also control for macroeconomic factors that are 
important in the evolution of capital flows and domestic credit, like the international interest 
rate and interest rate differentials. 
The explanatory variables can be grouped in four different categories: (i) a variable 
capturing the flexibility of the exchange rate regime (already described in more detail in 
Section II), (ii) macroeconomic factors, (iii) financial sector variables, and (iv) country and 
time dummies. 
The second category involves macroeconomic variables. Real GDP reflects the level 
of gross domestic product at constant prices, and intends to capture how the level of 
economic development affects in time the amount of capital flows. Real GDP growth 
captures whether higher economic growth attracts more capital inflows. The ratio of external 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Ghosh et al (2003) and Ghosh et al (2010). 15 
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debt to GDP and the ratio of exports and imports to GDP capture how the level of 
indebtedness and trade openness affect the amount of capital flows. The annual rate of 
inflation controls for the effect of inflation on the amount and composition of domestic 
credit. The ratio of broad money to GDP controls for factors that affect disposable funding 
for credit in the domestic financial system. The ratio of foreign currency deposit to total 
deposits measures the impact of domestic foreign currency financing on foreign currency 
lending. Finally, the real exchange rate level controls for the incentives that it may place on 
the decision to shift towards foreign currency lending. All these variables are standard in the 
literature. 
The variables in the third category control for the impact of financial sector 
developments. Interest rate differentials capture incentives for borrowers to demand credit in 
foreign currency. Capital inflows capture the impact of foreign funding in the volume and 
composition of domestic credit. 
As a last category, we include country dummies and time dummies to control for 
aggregate time shocks, i.e. international developments. Specifications including country and 
time dummies help us assess whether results are driven by cross-country or cross-time 
variation, which may have different implications in terms of policy. 
We estimate panel regressions for every dependent variable. The basic regression 
uses annual data for the pooled sample panel under ordinary least squares. The estimated 
equations are:  




such that  ,...,T t ,...,N i 1    and   , 1   . We assume that the error term i,t can be characterized 
by independently distributed random variables with mean zero and variance 
2
,t i  . Yi,t 
represents the four dependent variables defined above. The sub-indexes i and t stand for 
country and time respectively. Xi,t stands for the variable capturing exchange rate flexibility. 
Mi,t denotes variables controlling for macroeconomic effects. Fi,t captures the impact of 
financial sector variables. 
As a first alternative, we report within (or fixed effects) and time effects estimates. 
These models are estimated as: 
i,t t c t i i,t t i t i F M X f Y        ' ' ' ' , , / ,      , (2) 
such that fi/t are country and time specific effect, respectively. We assume that the error term 
i,t, can be characterized by independently distributed random variables with mean zero and 
variance 
2
,t i  . Finally, for robustness, through generalized least squares we estimate the panel 
allowing for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals. 
The above estimations assume exogeneity of the explanatory variables. However, to 
control for potential endogeneity biases and to check the robustness of the results, we also 
estimate instrumental variable models of equation (1), as the last alternative specification. 
V. Main Findings 
Following the evidence in Figure 3, we explore three main issues both in the basic 
pooled estimates as well as in alternative ones. We first analyze the impact of exchange rate 
flexibility on domestic credit to the private sector. Second, we study how the composition of 17 
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domestic credit is affected by flexibility. Finally, we assess whether the volume of capital 
flows is also affected by the exchange rate policy. 
1. Domestic Credit 
The estimates reported in Table 1 show that exchange rate flexibility has an impact on 
domestic credit levels, confirming the findings described in Figure 3. The pooled estimate 
suggests that the exchange rate regime variable is statistically significant (at the 1 percent 
level) and has a negative sign, implying that less flexible regimes are associated with higher 
credit to the private sector.
20 The point estimates suggest that the impact of exchange rate 
flexibility is economically relevant. A 1-point increase in the exchange rate classification 
index (a 17 percent increase) increases the ratio of domestic credit to GDP by about 4¼ 
percentage points (a 10 percent increase in the average credit to GDP ratio in the sample, 
which stands at 40 percent). 
Alternative estimates suggest that results are robust. Fixed (cross country and time) 
effects specifications, as well as Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and instrumental variables 
estimations suggest that the variable exchange rate regime has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient (in all cases, at the one percent level), suggesting that this relationship 
is explained both by cross-country and cross-time effects. Point estimates suggest that 
elasticities are similar to the ones obtained in the pooled estimates.  
As for the impact of other variables on domestic credit, Table 1 suggests that larger 
capital inflows and a larger depositor base (captured by the ratio of broad money to GDP) 
                                                 
20 A higher value in the exchange rate regime variable is associated with more flexible regimes. 18 
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also have a positive impact on domestic credit.
21 These coefficients are statistically 
significant across specifications.  
In summary, these results suggest that large capital inflows (i.e., banking system 
external funding) and less flexible exchange rate regimes tend to exacerbate domestic credit 
cycles. The fact that the exchange rate regime is statistically significant despite controlling 
for capital inflows suggests that the impact of exchange rate flexibility is likely working 
through a transmission channel that goes beyond the monetary expansion associated with 
capital inflows. A larger share of capital inflows could be intermediated through the banking 
system or the credit multiplier might be larger in economies with less flexible exchange 
regimes. This would be consistent with Montiel and Reinhart’s (2001) intuition, i.e. that a 
peg may be perceived as a guarantee on foreign currency claims, increasing the scope for 
banks to expand credit through external funding. 
 
 
                                                 
21 Regressions were also run using banking system leverage (i.e., loan to deposit ratios) instead of capital 





2. Credit Composition 
Table 2 suggests that credit composition is affected by exchange rate flexibility, also 
confirming the findings described in Figure 3. The pooled estimate suggests that the 
exchange rate regime variable is statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) and has a 
negative sign, implying that less flexible regimes are associated with a higher share of credit 
in foreign currency. The point estimates suggest that the impact of exchange rate flexibility is 
economically relevant. A 1-point increase in the exchange rate classification index increases 
the share of credit in foreign currency by about 14 percentage points (a 35 percent increase in 
the average share of foreign currency lending in the sample, which stands at 41 percent). 
Dependent Variable: Domestic Credit/GDP
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  1/
C 13.53 *** ‐5.86 15.38 *** 9.32 *** 12.82 *** 14.51 ***
Capital Inflows 1.04 *** 0.94 *** 0.93 *** 0.55 *** 1.04 *** 1.24 ***
Exchange Rate Regime ‐4.26 *** ‐5.19 *** ‐4.59 *** ‐2.59 *** ‐3.68 *** ‐4.39 ***
Inflation (‐1) ‐0.01 0.00 0.00 ‐0.01 * ‐0.01 ‐0.02 **
Broad Money/GDP 0.71 *** 1.16 *** 0.70 *** 0.75 *** 0.69 *** 0.73 ***
Dummy Crisis 26.81 * 31.12 *** 26.68 * 18.85 ** 26.73 ** 17.16
Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No
Time Effects No No Yes No No No
Cross‐Section W e i g h t s N oN oN o Y e sN o N o
Period W e i g h t s N oN oN o N o Y e s N o
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202
Adjusted R‐squared 0.57 0.88 0.57 0.64 0.58 0.59







Alternative estimates suggest that results are again robust. Fixed-effects, GLS, and 
instrumental variables estimations suggest that the exchange rate regime has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient (in most cases, at the one percent level). 
As for other variables, Table 2 suggests that capital inflows and a larger share of 
deposits in foreign currency are associated with a higher share of foreign currency credit. 
Both variables capture the incentives described above. Larger capital inflows (i.e., an 
increase in foreign funding) and deposit in foreign currency allow banks to expand credit 
portfolios, but they try to avoid a currency mismatch in their balance sheets by lending in 
foreign currency. As for borrowers, a higher interest rate differential between domestic and 
Dependent Variable: Domestic Credit in Foreign Currency/Total Domestic Credit
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  1/
C 60.02 *** 38.42 *** 60.69 *** 49.75 *** 59.40 *** 55.36 ***
Capital Inflows 0.55 * 0.42 *** 0.54 * 0.93 *** 0.62 ** 0.72 **
Exchange Rate Regime ‐14.14 *** ‐4.17 ** ‐14.48 *** ‐11.14 *** ‐14.04 *** ‐12.44 ***
Domestic deposit in FC/Tot Deposits 0.27 *** 0.35 *** 0.27 *** 0.33 *** 0.27 *** 0.32 ***
Inflation (‐1) 0.11 0.18 *** 0.13 0.09 0.11 ‐0.04
Interest Rate Differential 0.75 *** 0.06 0.75 *** 0.45 *** 0.76 *** 0.64 ***
Dummy Crisis 16.13 ‐5.51 15.56 21.13 *** 16.18 3.23
Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No
Time Effects No No Yes No No No
Cross‐Section W e i g h t s N oN oN o Y e sN o N o
Period W e i g h t s N oN oN o N o Y e s N o
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 158
Adjusted R‐squared 0.31 0.94 0.27 0.77 0.31 0.30






foreign currency financing places incentives to contract credit in foreign currency, which is 
reflected by the positive and statistically significant coefficient for this variable. 
  As a robustness test, we use banking leverage ratios instead of capital inflows as an 
explanatory variable for the share of domestic credit in foreign currency.
22 Leverage ratios 
capture the increase in banking system external funding sources associated with large capital 
inflows. Table 3 shows that the results are consistent with the regressions in Table 2: a higher 
share of domestic credit in foreign currency over the total is associated with less flexible 
exchange regimes and higher leverage ratios. Moreover, we also explore the  
 
                                                 
22 Leverage is defined as the loan-to-deposit ratio, and it proxies the expansion of the credit portfolio beyond the 





interaction between leverage and exchange rate flexibility, which shows that the positive 
relation between leverage and credit in foreign currency is stronger in countries with less 
flexible exchange rate regimes. This interaction variable has the opposite sign than the 
leverage variable—reducing its elasticity by more than a third in the pool estimate. In other 
words, less flexible exchange regimes exacerbate this interaction, i.e. the incentives for banks 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  1/
C 48.26 *** 32.29 *** 49.32 *** 48.25 *** 47.59 *** 48.70 ***
Leverage 0.23 *** 0.07 0.22 ** 0.23 *** 0.23 *** 0.22 **
Exchange Rate Regime ‐8.70 ** ‐6.23 *** ‐9.18 ** ‐11.13 *** ‐8.39 ** ‐8.97 **
Leverage*Exchange Rate Regime ‐0.09 ** 0.05 * ‐0.08 ** ‐0.06 *** ‐0.09 ** ‐0.08 **
Domestic deposit in FC/Tot Deposits 0.302268 *** 0.40 *** 0.30 *** 0.39 *** 0.30 *** 0.31 ***
Inflation (‐1) 0.06767 0.17 *** 0.11 ‐0.06 0.06 0.06
Interest Rate Differential 0.69 *** 0.16 0.70 *** 0.67 *** 0.70 *** 0.71 ***
Dummy Crisis ‐6.57 ‐0.29 ‐6.51 8.20 ‐7.83 ‐26.04
Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No
Time Effects No No Yes No No No
Cross‐Section W e i g h t s N oN oN o Y e sN o N o
Period W e i g h t s N oN oN o N o Y e s N o
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 158
Adjusted R‐squared 0.32 0.95 0.28 0.80 0.32 0.32







3. Capital Flows 
  Is it the case that the relationship between domestic credit and the exchange rate 
regime is largely explained by differences in the amount of capital inflows received by 
economies with different degrees of exchange rate flexibility?  
  In principle, fixed exchange rate regimes may attract larger volumes of capital 
inflows compared to flexible ones. By reducing nominal exchange rate volatility—compared 
to flexible regimes—pegs can reduce transaction costs, encouraging cross-border 
investment.
23 On shorter horizons, nominal exchange rate stability can place strong incentives 
for foreign investors to take advantage of even small interest rate differentials through carry 
trade.
24 Another reason why a fixed exchange rate regime may attract more capital is 
associated with a policy tool ubiquitous in pegs to prevent inflation and lower real interest 
rates in the presence of large capital inflows: sterilized intervention. Sterilized intervention 
would introduce a wedge in domestic interest rates and likely magnify the volumes of capital 
inflows.
25 
  However, the estimates reported in Table 4 suggest that exchange rate flexibility does 
not have an impact on the volume of capital flows going to emerging economies. Alternative 
estimations, including fixed effects, GLS controlling for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation in error terms, and instrumental variables do not change the picture. Capital 
inflows are larger in more open economies, economies that are more integrated to 
                                                 
23 For an analysis on nominal exchange rate volatility, see Ghosh et al (2003) and references therein. 
24 On carry trade, see for example Plantin and Shin (2011) and Brunnermeier et al (2009). 
25 On sterilization, see for example Calvo (1991), Fernández Arias and Montiel (1996), Montiel and Reinhart 
(2001), and Reinhart and Reinhart (2008). 24 
 
  24
international financial markets, and economies with a larger stock of external debt.
26 While 
the first explanatory variable may be capturing the fact that capital flows are oftentimes 
associated to trade flows, the last two variables suggests that more open financial accounts 
and previous access to financial flows (captured by the external debt stock) may have 
facilitated new foreign investments in emerging economies. 
  We have not been able to identify a variable capturing ‘push factors’, but regional 
factors may be playing a role. In Latin America, the 1990s were characterized by 
stabilization programs aiming at reducing inflation, reforming policy frameworks, and 
embarking in ambitious supply-side structural reforms that likely attracted new foreign 
investment. In Emerging Europe, the prospects (and eventually, the realization) of access to 
the European Union likely attracted significant amounts of new foreign investment. In this 
context, even if there was an impact associated with exchange rate flexibility, it may have 
been marginal compared to other pull factors. 
                                                 





VI. A Digression: Parallels with Advanced Economies 
While our analysis focuses on emerging markets, a snapshot of the advanced 
economies suggests that exchange rate flexibility may also play a role on credit expansions. 
Figure 4 below suggests that capital inflows may have also been associated with credit 
expansions in the euro zone since the mid-1990s.  Also, albeit with less significant capital 
inflows (in terms of GDP), countries with more flexible exchange regimes (UK and US) do 
Dependent Variable: Capital Flows/GDP
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  1/
C ‐1.10 ‐7.72 *** ‐2.58 0.31 1.08 ‐0.90
Exchange Rate Regime 0.27 ‐0.10 0.34 0.06 ‐0.08 0.02
Financial Deepness (‐1) ‐0.01 0.16 *** ‐0.05 * ‐0.01 0.00 ‐0.03
Financial Integration (‐1) 0.92 *** 1.21 *** 0.57 * 0.46 *** 0.70 *** 0.73 ***
Trade Openness (‐1) 0.04 *** 0.09 *** 0.05 *** 0.03 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 ***
Real GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00
Output Growth ‐0.08 0.09 0.03 0.06 ‐0.10 ‐0.03
External Debt/GDP (‐1) 0.05 *** 0.02 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.06 ***
International Interest Rate 0.00 0.18 0.39 0.02 ‐0.11 0.08
Dummy Crisis ‐11.33 ** ‐7.58 * ‐11.19 ** ‐9.41 *** ‐10.85 ‐9.41 *
Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No
Time Effects No No Yes No No No
Cross‐Section W e i g h t s N oN oN o Y e sN o N o
Period W e i g h t s N oN oN o N o Y e s N o
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 189
Adjusted R‐squared 0.30 0.70 0.32 0.53 0.25 0.32






not show a positive association between capital inflows and domestic credit expansions.  Of 
course, an important caveat to these differences in the correlations shown in Figure 4 is that 
in the UK and the US (which are less bank dependent) much of the increased leverage in the 
decade prior to the crisis was not in the form of domestic bank credit but through securitized 
debt.  Whether a broader definition of “credit” blurs these differences between the euro zone 
and the others remains to be seen. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Obstfeld and Gourinchas (2011) suggest that the 
impact of the recent financial crisis in advanced economies is similar to the one experienced 
by emerging markets in the past, and that credit expansions have been a critical element in 
these crises. While very preliminary, the evidence presented here suggests the impact of 
exchange rate flexibility and capital inflows on domestic credit may be relevant for advanced 
economies as well, and that this is an issue worth exploring. 

















































































































VII. Policy Implications and Further Issues 
  This paper contributes to the current debate on policies to manage large capital 
inflows in emerging economies. This debate focuses on policies that help contain domestic 
demand—critical to prevent exchange rate overshooting—and avoid boom-bust credit cycles 
and their consequences on asset prices—critical to avoid a hard-landing in case of capital 
flows reversals. Our work suggests that exchange rate flexibility may be instrumental in 
curving the effects of capital inflows on domestic credit. From a policy perspective, it 
suggests that relatively inflexible exchange rate regimes may need to be ‘counteracted’ by 
carefully designed macro-prudential policies. 
  With the main findings from our empirical exercise summarized in Table 5, we 
discuss in this section the kind of regulatory measures that could be used ‘counteractively’, 


















Our findings suggest that the most relevant tools to counteract lack of exchange rate 
flexibility (apart from the obvious implication of allowing for greater exchange rate 
flexibility) should target banks’ external funding and incentives to lend/borrow in foreign 
currency. Such measures include: 
  Currency-dependent liquidity requirements—maybe even combining them with 
marginal reserve requirements on external wholesale financing. Both contain credit 
and reduce incentives to borrow in foreign currency by reducing the interest rate 
differential between loans in domestic and foreign currency. Increasing reserve 
requirements across the board or imposing limits on external borrowing by the 
banking sector may of course also reduce domestic credit growth.  
  Increasing capital requirement for FX loans and/or introducing dynamic provisioning 
on FX loans (i.e. provisions increase as the share of FX loan over the total increases). 
These would place incentives for banks to internalize the higher credit risk associated 
with potential borrowers’ currency mismatches. They would also facilitate the 
building of buffers to cope with capital flows reversals. 
  Tightening debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios (conditional on the debts’ 
currency denomination) would also contribute to contain domestic credit directly, and 
might be more effective than traditional monetary tightening—i.e. increasing 
domestic interest rates. 
On the other hand, the fact that we do ,not find convincing evidence that the exchange 
regime has an impact on the amount of capital inflows—i.e. the former affects credit through 29 
 
  29
‘transmission channels’ rather than a ‘volume effect’—suggests that less flexible exchange 
regimes do not necessarily call for broader forms of capital controls. 
Our findings also suggest that lack of exchange rate flexibility may make the 
economy more vulnerable to reversals in capital flows, as credit expansions are more 
significant in economies with less flexible exchange regimes.
27 Capital flow reversals could 
potentially trigger a credit bust and asset price deflation, with significant consequences in 
macroeconomic conditions.  While the empirical evidence in this paper focuses on periods of 
large capital inflows, exploring the dynamics in credit markets during capital inflows 
reversals and their possible differences across exchange rate regime is no doubt needed to 
reach a fuller evaluation of the relative merits of some of the policies sketched here.
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